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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and 
CHARLES MAHOSKEY, : 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, : Case No. 900423-CA 
vs. : 
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD : Category No. 14b 
J. FARR and DR. CHRIS 
CHRISTENSEN, : 
Defendants/Respondents : 
INTRODUCTION 
The statement of the facts, the jurisdictional statement and 
the statement of the case are set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief at page 1 and pages 3 through 11. Jurisdiction has been 
conferred on the Appellate Court pursuant to UCA section 78-2-2 
(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1953 as amended), and Rule 42 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant takes this opportunity to 
respond to the arguments set forth in the respective briefs of the 
two respondents. The remaining arguments of the Appellant are 
adequately covered in Appellant's Opening Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. In a case involving alleged negligence for failure to 
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diagnose breast cancer, as a matter of law, is the mere natural 
anger and suspicion, of a layman plaintiff having no medical 
background, that her diagnosing physician "screwed up," equivalent 
to " knowledge" of the possibility that Plaintiff sustained an 
injury due to negligent action on the part of her physician? 
2. Under the facts of this case, construed in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, should the 
Plaintiff be construed to have had "constructive knowledge" 
that she sustained an injury due to negligence action on the 
part of her diagnosing physician, more than two years prior to 
commencing her action in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's suspicion of a remote possibility of negligence 
does not equate to the required finding that she had knowledge of 
the possibility that she had sustained an injury due to negligent 
action on the part of the Defendants. The Plaintiff has never 
taken the position that the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until she received an expert opinion concerning the 
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendants. In this 
case, the Plaintiff had no meaningful information relating to the 
possibility of negligence by the Defendants in failing to diagnose 
her breast cancer, until she contacted her attorney in October 
1988. 
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The court should find that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Plaintiff should have discovered 
her legal injury prior to August of 1988. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT SHE HAD SUSTAINED AN INJURY 
DUE TO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE 
DEFENDANTS, MORE THAN TWO YEARS PRIOR TO HER 
COMMENCING HER ACTION IN THIS MATTER. 
As was discussed in our previous brief, the test for 
determining whether the statute of limitations should begin to run 
is whether the Plaintiff had knowledge of or was aware of facts 
that would lead her to conclude there was a possibility of 
negligence on the part of the Defendant doctors. Deschamps v. 
Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473-474 (Utah App. 1989). 
There are three facts peculiar to this case that distinguish 
it from all the other previous appellate cases relating to the 
issue of the running of the issue of the statute of limitations in 
a medical malpractice law suit. They are as follows: 
(1) This case is based upon negligence due to 
failure to diagnose breast cancer rather than 
upon negligence due to administering 
affirmative medical care in a faulty manner; 
(2) The Plaintiff in this case is a layman 
with no medical background whatsoever; 
(3) The Plaintiff in this case, despite 
exercising reasonable diligence in conducting 
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an investigation into the possibility of 
negligence of the defendants, was unable to 
obtain any helpful information concerning the 
possibility of such negligence from any 
source, prior to discussing the case with 
her attorney in October 1988. 
These facts should be given special consideration in determining 
whether the statute of limitations began to run in this case 
prior to the late summer of 1988. 
In Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P 2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979) the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that: 
"In the health care field it is typically the 
case that there is often a great disparity in 
the knowledge of those who provide health care 
services and those who receive the services 
with respect to expected and unexpected side 
effects of a given procedure, as well as the 
nature, degree, and extent of expected after 
effects. While the recipient may be aware of 
a disability or a disfunction, there may be, 
to the untutored understanding of the average 
layman, no apparent connection between the 
treatment provided by the physician and the 
injuries suffered." 
This is a case where the connection between the possible 
negligence and the injury suffered is even more obscure to the 
average layman. The alleged negligence arose from ci failure to 
diagnose, rather than from negligence in administration of 
treatment. A causal connection between negligent medical care and 
physical injury is certainly more obvious where treatment has been 
positively rendered by some affirmative action and is thereafter 
followed by an adverse medical condition which did not exist until 
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treatment was given. In the case of a negligent diagnosis, the 
connection between negligent medical care and physical injury may 
never be recognized. The Wyoming Supreme Court considered the 
difficulty of making a causal connection between negligent medical 
care and physical injury in a situation where the alleged 
negligence was the failure to diagnose an affliction. 
" In cases involving an undiagnosed affliction 
especially, the patient may not discover the 
wrong until so informed by another doctor: The 
question of malpractice in a diagnostic 
situation is often dependent upon when the 
Plaintiff is informed by another physician 
that the original diagnosis was wrong and 
whether if a correct diagnosis had been made 
and treatment rendered the ultimate result 
would have changed. Moreover, the fact that 
the Plaintiff obtains a correct diagnosis does 
not necessarily constitute notice that the 
earlier incorrect diagnosis was rendered 
negligently." 
Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P. 2d 414, 419 (Wyo. 1985). In light of the 
difficulty in determining whether negligence has taken place in a 
case involving failure to diagnose a condition, it is absurd to 
impute knowledge of such negligence in this case to the Plaintiff, 
a layman with no medical background, unless the Plaintiff had 
obtained some additional information that would tend to show that 
the Defendants' failure to diagnose breast cancer in 1985 was 
negligent behavior. 
In this case, despite making inquiries to her other doctors 
prior to receiving treatment of her cancer, the Plaintiff was 
initially unable to obtain any helpful information relating to 
whether the Defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose her 
breast cancer in April of 1985. Thereafter, because of 
prolonged illness and stress brought on by the treatment and 
possible recurrence of the breast cancer, the Plaintiff was unable 
to continue her investigation until August or September 1988. 
Shortly after resuming her investigation into the possibility of 
negligence on the part of the Defendants, in October 1988, she 
discussed her case with her attorney, who counseled her of a 
possibility of negligence. Because the Plaintiff did not have 
knowledge or awareness of any helpful inf ormation or facts 
relating to the possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants, until the late summer of 1988, the statute of 
limitations should not begin to run until the late summer of 1988. 
The Defendants put much emphasis on the fact that in July of 
1985, upon discovering that she had breast cancer, the Plaintiff 
was angry towards the Defendants in this case and suspected that 
there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants in failing to diagnose her breast cancer in April of 
1985. The Plaintiff stated that she was angry with the Defendants 
and that she felt they had somehow "screwed up." The Defendants 
would have this court equate such "anger and suspicion" of the 
Plaintiff with "knowledge" or "awareness" of facts that would lead 
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her to conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the part 
of the Defendants. However, it is obvious that the suspicion of 
the possibility of negligence is present in every situation where 
medical care does not produce the desired results. Therefore, as 
common sense might lead one to believe, the 10 th Circuit 
Appellate Court concluded that the mere suspicion of the 
possibility of negligence by a defendant, or the mere existence 
of the possibility that the Plaintiff had factual knowledge of the 
possibility of negligence by a defendant, is not enough to begin 
the running of the statute of limitations against the Plaintiff. 
See, Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604 (Utah, 10th Cir. 1983). 
This court should also follow principles of common sense and sound 
legal reasoning and conclude that mere suspicion or anger about 
the possibility of negligence does not equate with knowledge or 
awareness of facts that would lead the Plaintiff to conclude that 
there was a possibility of negligence. 
Plaintiff in her Opening Appellate Brief argued that the 
possibilities of medical negligence for which Plaintiff should be 
accountable and those which should trigger the statute of 
limitations to run are "reasonable" possibilities, not "remote" 
ones. The Defendants have argued that this position is not 
supported by the law. However, the law always requires 
reasonableness as the standard of behavior in any situation. 
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Furthermore, because the practice of medicine is not an exact 
science, there is always a "remote" possibility that a medical 
professional has been negligent when his medical care does not 
produce the expected results. Moreover, if a "remote" possibility 
of medical negligence was sufficient grounds for legal action, a 
claimant would be deemed to have knowledge of the possibility of 
negligence at the time he obtained knowledge of the physical 
injuries. There would be no reason for the Utah courts to have 
ruled that: 
"Under Foil, the statutory 2-year limitations 
period does not commence to run until the 
injured person (1) knows or should know that 
she has sustained an injury, and (2) knows or 
should know that this injury was caused by 
negligence." 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d at 473. If all that was required was 
a remote possibility of negligence a claimant would be deemed to 
have knowledge of the possibility of negligence when he had 
knowledge that he had sustained a physical injury, and the second 
prong of the Foil test would thus become meaningless and useless. 
Therefore, again, both common sense and sound legal reasoning 
require that the possibility of medical negligence for which 
Plaintiff should be accountable and which would trigger the 
statute of limitations to run should be a "reasonable" 
possibility of negligence, not merely a "remote" possibility of 
negligence. 
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In addition, the Defendant has argued that the Plaintiff had 
exactly the same information in the late summer and early fall of 
1988 that she had in July 1985, and had obtained no additional 
information relating to the possibility of negligence on the part 
of the Defendants between July 1985 and October 1988. This 
statement is true in part, because the Plaintiff did not have any 
additional information relating to the possibility of negligence 
from July 1985 to October 1988. This was due to the fact that 
within a week or two after discovering that she had breast cancer, 
the Plaintiff had an operation to remove her breast and then began 
chemotherapy treatments to treat the cancer. Even after the 
chemotherapy treatments ended in February 1986, the Plaintiff 
continued to suffer devastating side effects from her surgery and 
chemotherapy. Among other things, Plaintiff lost her hair and her 
immune system ceased to function normally. Consequently, 
Plaintiff constantly suffered from illnesses, chronic weakened 
physical condition and continuous mental and emotional distress 
until late summer 1988. The Plaintiff's continuous poor health 
and subsequent concomitant stresses, in addition to her 
preoccupation with the foreseeable reoccurrence of the cancer, 
rendered the plaintiff unable to work or rationally investigate 
the possibility that Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen were negligent 
in failing to diagnose her breast cancer, until August or 
9 
September of 1988. Therefore, the Plaintiff's ability to conduct 
a reasonable investigation into the possibility of negligence on 
the part of the Defendants was effectively destroyed until August 
or September 1988. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff did resume 
her investigation of the possibility of negligence on the part of 
the Defendants in this matter. In October 1988, she consulted her 
Attorney, Douglas M. Durbano, and obtained a preliminary opinion 
that there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants in this matter. Thus, in October 1988, the Plaintiff 
did obtain information in addition to the information she had in 
her possession in July 1985. Again, these facts dictate that the 
statute of limitations in this case should not begin to run until 
the late summer of 1988. 
Finally, the Defendants misconstrue the Plaintiff's position 
in this matter, in representing that the Plaintiff has taken the 
legal position that she should not be construed to have discovered 
her legal injury until she had received an expert opinion 
regarding negligence from either a doctor or a lawyer in this 
case. The Plaintiff has never taken the position that she could 
not know of her legal injury until she received an expert medical 
opinion or legal opinion confirming malpractice. The fact remains 
that the Plaintiff did not have any information relating to the 
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendant from any 
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source until she talked with her attorney in October 1988. If she 
had obtained any helpful and relevant information relating to the 
possibility of negligence on the part of the Defendants before 
September 1988, that information would have been relevant in 
determining whether the statute of limitations began to run at an 
earlier date. The fact that the first information received by the 
Plaintiff relating to the possibility of negligence on the part of 
the Defendants came from her attorney does not somehow make the 
court's ruling in Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P. 2d 471 (Utah App. 
1989), that an expert medical opinion regarding medical 
malpractice is not required to begin the running of the statute 
of limitations, relevant to this case in some distorted way. 
POINT II 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD "CONSTRUCTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE" OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHE HAD 
SUSTAINED AN INJURY DUE TO NEGLIGENT ACTION 
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS, MORE THAN TWO 
YEARS PRIOR TO COMMENCING HER ACTION IN THIS 
MATTER. 
As has been argued above, the Plaintiff did not have the 
"knowledge" of or an "awareness" of facts that would lead her to 
believe that there was a possibility of negligence on the part of 
the Defendants, until October of 1988. However, the Plaintiff 
concedes that as of July of 1985, she did have knowledge of facts 
which would create an obligation on her part to inquire into the 
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possibility of negligence. U.C.A. Section 78-12-14(1) states in 
relevant part: 
"No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence...." [Emphasis added.] 
The key issue in this case, therefore, is whether the 
Plaintiff, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have 
obtained knowledge of facts that would lead her to conclude that 
there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants prior to October of 1988. The Plaintiff did submit 
evidence to the trial court alleging that she conducted a 
reasonable inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the part 
of the Defendants. Therefore, the real issue before* the court, 
which is actually a factual issue to be determined by the trier-
of-fact, is whether it was reasonable for the Plaintiff to 
discontinue her inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the 
part of the Defendants, from August of 1985 until August of 1988, 
during the period in which she was suffering from the side effects 
of her cancer and the treatment for her cancer, and before she 
could resume her normal activities in August of 1988. The 
Defendants have not controverted the evidence presented by the 
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Plaintiff on this issue. Moreover, the reasonableness of the 
Plaintiff's inquiry into the possibility of negligence on the part 
of the Defendants is a factual issue, which should be determined 
only by the trier-of-fact in this case. Therefore, it was error 
on the part of the trial court to conclude that the statute of 
limitations barred Plaintiff's Complaint in this case. The 
appellate court should remand this case to the trial court to 
conduct a bifurcated trial on the issue of statute of limitations 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47. 
CONCLUSION 
The suspicions and anger held by the Plaintiff towards the 
Defendants in this action, that such Defendants should have 
diagnosed Plaintiff's cancer in April of 1985, do not in and of 
themselves, standing alone, constitute knowledge or awareness on 
the part of the Plaintiff of facts sufficient to lead her to 
conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants in this case. Therefore, it was error on the part of 
the trial court to rule as a matter of law that such suspicions 
and anger are equivalent to "knowledge" of facts that would lead 
Plaintiff to conclude there was a possibility of negligence on the 
part of the Defendants. In addition, a genuine factual issue 
exists as to whether the Plaintiff used reasonable diligence in 
conducting an inquiry into the possibility that the failure of the 
13 
Defendants to diagnose her cancer constituted negligence. 
Therefore, because an issue of material fact existed in this 
case, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule as a 
matter of law that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff's 
action in this case. Accordingly, the Plaintiff requests the 
Appellate Court to reverse the order of summary judgment of the 
trial court, and further requests that she be awarded her court 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in appealing this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /0*^ day of September, 1990. 
sF^ 50UGLAS M//T)URBAN( 
PAUL H. JOHNSON 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f / 
A p p e l l a n t 
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